

# The Mutable Geography of Firms' International Trade: Evidence and Macroeconomic Implications

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# Introduction

- International trade is dominated by firms selling to multiple destinations
  - e.g., multi-destination exporters account for 75% transactions and 95% trade values of China's exports.
- Conventional wisdom: stable market structure
  - i.e., once a firm starts exporting to a market, it keeps selling there
- Empirically: the set of destinations changes frequently for a multi-destination exporter:

Trade Pattern of a Chinese Exporter (ID 3107930188)  
Selling T-shirts (HS 61091000)

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2006	Australia			Germany	Belgium Canada

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# Questions

**[Micro:]** What are the drivers of these **within-firm** changes in trade patterns? How are these market changes related to firms' price and quantity adjustments across markets?

**[Macro:]** Are these market changes important for aggregate fluctuations and welfare?

- How do these market changes affect the global transmission of shocks?
- How do they impact our analysis of recent bilateral events?  
e.g., US-China trade war

# This Paper

- 1 **[Empirical] new facts** on firm (and firm-product) level market changes based on two customs databases (China 2000-2006 and UK 2010-2016).

These within-firm market changes:

- (i) involve substantial market switching


→ 30-40% involves simultaneously adding and dropping markets

- (ii) are endogenous to changes in (relative) local market conditions

→ exchange rates and local CPIs explain 20% of variation

- (iii) suggest systematic changes in demand conditions in all markets

→ more markets are dropped (than added) ⇒ big drop in quantity but little change in price in those unchanged (continuing) markets




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


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
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




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
- ① **[Empirical] new facts** on firm (and firm-product) level market changes based on two customs databases (China 2000-2006 and UK 2010-2016). These within-firm market changes:
  - (i) involve substantial market switching
  - (ii) are endogenous to changes in relative market conditions
  - (iii) suggest systematic changes in demand conditions in all markets
- ② **[A multi-country model]** to quantify the sources of these market changes and their aggregate impacts:
  - [Key elements]** variable markups + variable markets
  - [Impact]** on shock transmission in a bilateral trade war scenario
    - the aggregate productivity increases more (10%) for the third country with endogenous market choices

# Application: Bilateral Trade War (C-A)




- Three countries (A, B, and C); a continuum of industries in each country
- Within each industry, there is a limited number of domestic and foreign firms competing with each other

# Application: Bilateral Trade War (C-A)



- Aggregate productivities of warring countries A and C decrease
- Aggregate productivity of the third country B increases

# Application: Bilateral Trade War (C-A)



The effects of endogenous market choices (in relative terms):

- (i) the aggregate productivities of A and C fall by more (-1%)
- (ii) the aggregate productivity of B increases by more (10%)

# Contribution to the Literature

## ① Pricing-to-market and international shock transmissions:

e.g., Dornbush (1987); Corsetti and Dedola (2005); Atkeson and Burstein (2008); Amiti, Itskhoki and Konings (2012, 2018), Chatterjee, Dix-Carneiro and Vichyanond (2013); Fitzgerald and Haller (2014, 2018); Auer and Schoenle (2016); Corsetti, Crowley, Han and Song (WP2019)

**This paper → firms actively adjust their set of destination markets due to large fluctuations in destination-specific residual demand**

## ② Margins of trade and export dynamics:

e.g., Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004); Chaney (2008, 2014); Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010); Albornoz, Pardo, Corcos, and Ornelas (2012); Békés and Muraközy (2012); Fitzgerald, Haller and Yedid-Levi (2017); Ciliberto and Jäkel (2017); Ruhl and Willis (2018); Geishecker, Schröder and Sørensen (2019); Macedoni and Xu (2020);

→ **new measures to quantify within-firm market changes:**

**(i) endogenous to local market conditions;**

**(ii) suggest systematic demand changes in all markets**

## ③ Trade, markups and welfare:

e.g., Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015); Feenstra and Weinstein (2017); Arkolakis, Costinot, Donaldson and Rodriguez-Clare (2018)

→ **study the effect of market changes on competition and welfare in a multi-country framework**

# Roadmap

## ① Empirical Results

- New measures of within-firm market changes
- Market changes and relative market conditions
- Market changes and intensive margin adjustments in continuing markets

## ② Multi-country General Equilibrium Model

- Featuring variable markups and variable markets

## ③ Aggregate Implications

- Application: bilateral “trade war”

## ④ Conclusions

## Measures of Variable Markets

Consider a firm selling a product to countries A, B, C, D over 4 time periods:

				Trade Pattern	Activity	M. Changes/ Markets	Drops/ Changes	
$t = 1$	A	B		A-B	–	–	–	
$t = 2$	A		C	A-C	Churn	2/2	1/2	
$t = 3$	A		C	D	A-C-D	Add	1/3	0/1
$t = 4$	A		C		A-C	Drop	1/2	1/1

Note: Add  $\Leftrightarrow$  drops/changes = 0; Churn  $\Leftrightarrow$   $0 < \text{drops/change} < 1$ ; Drop  $\Leftrightarrow$  drops/change = 1

Corresponding value measures:

$$\text{Market Changes/Markets in period 2} = \frac{V_{B,1} + V_{C,2}}{V_{A,2} + V_{C,2}}$$

$$\text{Drops/Changes in period 2} = \frac{V_{B,1}}{V_{B,1} + V_{C,2}}$$

e.g.  $V_{B,1}$  refers to the trade value at firm-product level to country B in period 1.

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# Data

## 1 Chinese Customs Data, 2000-2006

	Products (HS8)	Exporters	Observations	Value (billion US\$)
All	7,620	183,993	18,676,554	2,917

## 2 UK Customs Data, 2010-2016 (HMRC administrative datasets)

	Products (CN8)	Exporters	Observations	Value (billion £)
All	10,457	165,798	16,357,110	1,987
Non-EU	10,032	159,328	6,772,946	990
EU*	10,249	35,751	9,584,164	997

- An observation is a firm-product-destination-year quartet.

Note: \* UK-EU transactions are available only for firms whose trade value exceeds £250,000 in a given calendar year; these firms account for 96-98% of total trade values.

# Within-Firm Market Changes

A typical exporter changes more than half of its markets on a year-to-year basis

## Markets Changes/ Markets (Count Measure, Median)

	All Firms	Large Firms
<i>Chinese Exporters, 2000-2006</i>		
Firm-product (8-digit) level	0.70	0.67
Firm-industry (2-digit) level	0.60	0.52
Firm level	0.57	0.50
<i>British Exporters, 2010-2016</i>		
Firm-product (8-digit) level	0.50	0.50
Firm-industry (2-digit) level	0.50	0.40
Firm level	0.62	0.38

Value Measure

Breakdown by Firm and Product Types

Deviation from Common Trade Pattern

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# Drop-to-Change Ratio and Market Churning

## Statistics from Firm-product Level Trade Patterns (Median)

	All Firms	Large Firms
<i>Chinese Exporters, 2000-2006</i>		
Markets Drop/ Market Changes (Count Measure)	0.50	0.50
Markets Drop/ Market Changes (Value Measure)	0.41	0.35
Probability of Churn	0.26	0.33
<i>British Exporters, 2010-2016</i>		
Markets Drop/ Market Changes (Count Measure)	0.50	0.50
Markets Drop/ Market Changes (Value Measure)	0.48	0.46
Probability of Churn	0.32	0.45

- Drop-to-change (DC) ratio is a directional measure of market changes  
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# Roadmap

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# Market Changes and Local Market Conditions

## Constructing firm(-product) level measures of changes in local market conditions (focusing on those changed markets)

				Continuing Markets	Changed Markets	Changes in Relative Exchange Rates
$t = 1$	A	<b>B</b>	<input type="checkbox"/>	—	—	—
$t = 2$	A	<input type="checkbox"/>	<b>C</b>	A	B, C	$\log(e_{C,2}/e_{C,1}) - \log(e_{B,2}/e_{B,1})$
$t = 3$	A	<input type="checkbox"/>	C	A, C	D	$\log(e_{D,3}/e_{D,2})$
$t = 4$	A	<input type="checkbox"/>	C	A, C	D	$-\log(e_{D,4}/e_{D,3})$

Note: Circled cells mark the variation used to construct relative exchange rates.

## Regressing drop-to-change (DC) ratio on the constructed measures

$$DC_{f,i,t} = \beta_e \tilde{e}_{f,i,t} + \beta_P \tilde{P}_{f,i,t} + \delta_{f,i} + \delta_t + \epsilon_{f,i,t}$$

where  $DC_{f,i,t}$  is drop-to-change ratio;  $\tilde{e}_{f,i,t}$  is relative exchange rates;  $\tilde{P}_{f,i,t}$  is relative local CPI rate;  $\delta_{f,i}$  and  $\delta_t$  are firm-product and time fixed effects respectively;  $f, i, t =$  firm, product, time.

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# Market Changes and Local Market Conditions

Regressing drop-to-change (DC) ratio on changes in local market conditions  
(results from Chinese exporters, 2000-2006)

	Exchange Rate	Destination CPI	Within $R^2$	Observations
<u>Count Measure</u>				
Firm-product (8-digit) level	-0.22***	-0.81***	0.23	1,791,353
Firm-industry (2-digit) level	-0.14***	-0.59***	0.21	875,096
Firm level	-0.12***	-0.45***	0.20	301,455
<u>Trade Value Measure</u>				
Firm-product (8-digit) level	-0.21***	-0.83***	0.17	1,791,353
Firm-industry (2-digit) level	-0.14***	-0.61***	0.16	875,095
Firm level	-0.11***	-0.46***	0.16	301,455

Data source: Chinese Customs Database, 2000-2006

Note: The statistical significance is calculated based on robust standard errors with \*\*\*, \*\*, \* representing statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Firm-product and year fixed effects are added for firm-product and firm-industry specifications. Firm and year fixed effects are added for firm level specifications.

UK Results

# Market Changes, Prices and Quantities

How are firms' price and quantity changes in those continuing markets related to their drop-to-change ratio?

				Changes in the Unit Value of Continuing Markets	Drops/Changes
$t = 1$	A	B		.	.
	↓				
$t = 2$	A	C		$p_{A,2} - p_{A,1}$	1/2
	↓	↓			
$t = 3$	A	C	D	$p_{AC,3} - p_{AC,2}$	0/1
	↓	↓			
$t = 4$	A	C		$p_{AC,4} - p_{AC,3}$	1/1

Constructing Price Changes for **Continuing** Markets

# Price and Quantity Changes in Continuing Markets

Price and Quantity Elasticities to Drop-Change Ratio in Continuing Markets

	Unit Value	Mean Quantity	Observations
<i>Chinese Exporters, 2000-2006</i>			
Firm-product level	0.01*** <sup>†</sup>	-0.65***	1,244,580
Firm-industry level	0.03*** <sup>†</sup>	-0.73***	731,199
Firm level	0.05*** <sup>†</sup>	-0.73***	281,564
<i>British Exporters, 2010-2016</i>			
Firm-product level	0.00 <sup>†</sup>	-0.51***	1,149,821
Firm-industry level	0.01** <sup>†</sup>	-0.39***	488,877
Firm level	0.02* <sup>†</sup>	-0.25***	230,634

Note: Each cell represents an estimate from a separate estimation equation.

<sup>†</sup> indicates the significance of the estimate is sensitive to alternative samples.

Firm(-product/industry) and year fixed effects are included.

Results for All Markets

- Little change in price but large drop in quantity  
⇒ **firms dropping more markets also reduce sales in continuing markets because of common negative demand shocks.**

# Roadmap

## ① Empirical Results

- New measures of within-firm market changes
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## ② **Multi-country General Equilibrium Model**

- **Featuring variable markups and variable markets**

## ③ Aggregate Implications

- Application: bilateral “trade war”

## ④ Conclusions

# A Multi-country General Equilibrium Model with Variable Markups and Variable Markets

Key Elements:

## ① Variable Markets

- $H > 2$  countries in the world
- Firms making entry decisions for each country separately in each period

## ② Variable Markups

- **demand** competition by local and international producers of substitutable goods (Atkeson and Burstein 2008; Midrigan, Edmond and Xu 2015)
- **local cost** component: the need for local production and retail distribution (e.g., Corsetti and Dedola 2005)

# Production of Final and Intermediate Goods

Final consumption and the price of final good are:

$$C_{d,t} \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 (C_{i,d,t})^{\frac{\eta-1}{\eta}} di \right]^{\frac{\eta}{\eta-1}}, \quad P_{d,t} \equiv \left[ \int_0^1 (P_{i,d,t})^{1-\eta} di \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\eta}}$$

Industry level consumption and the price of intermediate good are:

$$C_{i,d,t} = \left[ \sum_f \sum_o (\alpha_{f,i,o,d,t})^{\frac{1}{\rho}} (q_{f,i,o,d,t})^{\frac{\rho-1}{\rho}} \phi_{f,i,o,d,t} \right]^{\frac{\rho}{\rho-1}},$$
$$P_{i,d,t} = \left[ \sum_f \sum_o \alpha_{f,i,o,d,t} (p_{f,i,o,d,t})^{1-\rho} \phi_{f,i,o,d,t} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\rho}}$$

- subscripts:  $f$  firm,  $i$  industry,  $o$  origin,  $d$  destination,  $t$  time
- $1 < \eta$  (cross-industry elasticity of substitution)  $< \rho$  (within-industry elasticity of substitution)
- $\alpha$  preference shifter
- $q$  and  $p$  are firm-level price and quantity respectively
- $\phi_{f,i,o,d,t} \in \{0, 1\}$  indicates whether firm  $f$  in industry  $i$  from origin  $o$  sells to destination  $d$  at  $t$
- all prices denominated in the destination currency



# Price and Export Decisions

Firms compete by simultaneously choosing:

- 1 whether to enter a market, indicated by  $\phi_{f,i,o,d,t}$
- 2 and if enter, the price  $p_{f,i,o,d,t}$  internalizing
  - (i) impact on the industry level price index  $P_{i,d,t}$  and
  - (ii) the wedge  $\chi_{f,i,o,d,t}$  between producer and consumer prices

$$\pi_{f,i,o,d,t} = \max_{p_{f,i,o,d,t}, \phi_{f,i,o,d,t}} \left[ q_{f,i,o,d,t} (\mu_{f,i,o,d,t}^b - 1) mc_{f,i,o,t} - W_{o,t} F_x \right] \phi_{f,i,o,d,t}$$

subject to

$$q_{f,i,o,d,t} = \alpha_{f,i,o,d,t} \left( \frac{p_{f,i,o,d,t}}{P_{i,d,t}} \right)^{-\rho} \left( \frac{P_{i,d,t}}{P_{d,t}} \right)^{-\eta} C_{d,t}$$
$$\mu_{f,i,o,d,t}^b = \frac{(p_{f,i,o,d,t} - \chi_{f,i,o,d,t}) e_{o,d,t}}{\tau_{o,d} mc_{f,i,o,t}}$$

$\mu^b$  denotes producer's markup denominated in home currency

$mc_{f,i,o,t}$  marginal cost of firm  $f$  from industry  $i$  and origin  $o$  at time  $t$

$e_{o,d,t}$  bilateral exchange rate; defined as units of currency  $o$  per unit of currency  $d$  at time  $t$

$\tau_{o,d}$  bilateral trade cost (including tariff)

$F_x$  fixed cost of export;  $W_{o,t}$  nominal wage in origin  $o$  at time  $t$

# Variable Markets and Profit Heterogeneity

## Probability of Market Change

$$= Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) + Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} > 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0)$$

## Drop to Change Ratio

$$= \frac{Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0)}{Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) + Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} > 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0)}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} & Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) \\ & = Pr((1 + \hat{\pi}_{k,i,o,d,t})\pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0 | \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) \end{aligned}$$

# Variable Markets and Profit Heterogeneity

## Probability of Market Change

$$= Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) + Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} > 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0)$$

## Drop to Change Ratio

$$= \frac{Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0)}{Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) + Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} > 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0)}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} & Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) \\ & = Pr((1 + \hat{\pi}_{k,i,o,d,t})\pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0 | \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) \end{aligned}$$

# Variable Markets and Profit Heterogeneity

## Probability of Market Change

$$= Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) + Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} > 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0)$$

## Drop to Change Ratio

$$= \frac{Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0)}{Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) + Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} > 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0)}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} & Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t+1} < 0 \cap \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) \\ &= Pr((1 + \hat{\pi}_{k,i,o,d,t})\pi_{k,i,o,d,t} < 0 | \pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) Pr(\pi_{k,i,o,d,t} > 0) \end{aligned}$$

# Variable Markets and Profit Heterogeneity II

Changes in potential profit  $\hat{\pi}_{k,i,o,d,t}^*$  is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\pi}_{k,i,o,d,t}^* \propto & \underbrace{\hat{\alpha}_{k,i,o,d,t}}_{\text{taste}} - [\varepsilon_{k,i,o,d,t}(1 - dm_{k,i,o,d,t}) - 1] \underbrace{\hat{m}c_{k,i,o,t}}_{\text{marginal cost}} \\ & - \varepsilon_{k,i,o,d,t} dm_{k,i,o,d,t} \underbrace{\hat{\chi}_{k,i,o,d,t}}_{\text{retail cost}} \\ & - \frac{\rho - \eta}{\rho - 1} \underbrace{\hat{C}E_{k,i,o,d,t}}_{\text{competitors' effect}} \\ & + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{k,i,o,d,t}(1 - dm_{k,i,o,d,t})\hat{e}_{o,d,t} + \eta\hat{P}_{d,t} + \hat{C}_{d,t}}_{\text{local market conditions}} \end{aligned}$$

Channels of variable markups:

$$\text{(Competition)} \quad \varepsilon_{k,i,o,d,t} = \rho(1 - ms_{k,i,o,d,t}) + \eta ms_{k,i,o,d,t}$$

$$\text{(Local cost)} \quad dm_{k,i,o,d,t} = \frac{\chi_{k,i,o,d,t}}{p_{k,i,o,d,t}^{\text{border}} + \chi_{k,i,o,d,t}}$$

## Competitors' Effect

$$\begin{aligned}
 \widehat{CE}_{k,i,o,d,t} \approx & \underbrace{\sum_{o'} \sum_{f \neq k} \phi_{f,i,o',d,t+1} \phi_{f,i,o',d,t} ms_{f,i,o',d,t} (1 - \rho) \widehat{p}_{f,i,o',d,t}}_{\text{impact of continuing firms}} \\
 & + \underbrace{\sum_{o'} \sum_{f \neq k} \phi_{f,i,o',d,t+1} (1 - \phi_{f,i,o',d,t}) ms_{f,i,o',d,t+1}}_{\text{impact of entrants}} \\
 & - \underbrace{\sum_{o'} \sum_{f \neq k} (1 - \phi_{f,i,o',d,t+1}) \phi_{f,i,o',d,t} ms_{f,i,o',d,t}}_{\text{impact of exitors}}
 \end{aligned}$$



where

$$\begin{aligned}
 \widehat{p}_{f,i,o',d,t} = & (1 - \omega_{f,i,o',d,t}) (\widehat{mc}_{f,i,o',t} - \widehat{e}_{o',d,t}) \\
 & + \omega_{f,i,o',d,t} \widehat{\chi}_{f,i,o',d,t} + \kappa_{f,i,o',d,t} \widehat{ms}_{f,i,o',d,t}
 \end{aligned}$$

$\omega(mc, \chi, e)$ : cost share of local component

$\kappa(ms, \eta, \rho)$ : price elasticity w.r.t. market share

# Multilateral Competition Effect



- Multilateral competition flattens the distribution of profits, making exporters more sensitive to shocks
- Entry and exit of foreign firms have a larger impact on others' residual demand

# Equilibrium

**Production:**

$$mc_{f,i,o,t} = \frac{W_{o,t}}{\Omega_{f,i,o,t}}, \quad mc_{N,d,t} = \frac{W_{d,t}}{\Omega_{N,d,t}}$$

**Goods market clearing:**

$$\begin{aligned} C_{d,t} &= Y_{d,t} \\ \sum_d q_{f,i,o,d,t} &= \Omega_{f,i,o,t} l_{f,i,o,t} \\ q_{N,d,t} &= \sum_i \sum_o \sum_f q_{f,i,o,d,t} \frac{\chi_{f,i,o,d,t}}{P_{N,d,t}} = \Omega_{N,d,t} L_{N,d,t} \end{aligned}$$

**Labor market clearing:**

$$\sum_i \sum_f l_{f,i,o,t} + L_{N,o,t} + \sum_i \sum_{d \neq o} \sum_f \phi_{f,i,o,d,t} F_x + \sum_i \sum_f \phi_{f,i,o,o,t} F_h = L_{o,t} = 1$$

**Balance of trade** determines the bilateral exchange rates; for  $o \neq d$ ,

$$\sum_i \sum_f (p_{f,i,d,o,t} - \chi_{f,i,o,d,t}) q_{f,i,d,o,t} = \sum_i \sum_f (p_{f,i,d,o,t} - \chi_{f,i,o,d,t}) q_{f,i,o,d,t} * e_{o,d,t}$$



# Key Moments

Work in Progress

---

	Data	3-Country Model
<b>Extensive margin</b>		
Markets Changes / Markets (median)	0.60	0.94
Drop-to-Change Ratio (median)	0.50	0.50
<b>Intensive margin</b>		
Destination Specific Markup Elasticity <sup>†</sup>	0.07	0.14
Cross Market Supply Elasticity <sup>†</sup>	4.09	1.67
<b>Linking intensive and extensive margins</b>		
Price Elasticity to Drop-to-Change Ratio (All Markets)	0.15	0.19
Quantity Elasticity to Drop-to-Change Ratio (All Markets)	-2.49	-2.95

---

Calibrated based on Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015)

<sup>†</sup> Estimates from Corsetti, Crowley, Han, and Song (2019)

Calibration

Additional Model Moments

The Effect of Local Cost Component

# Roadmap

## ① Empirical Results

- New measures of within-firm market changes
- Market changes and relative market conditions
- Market changes and intensive margin adjustments in continuing markets

## ② Multi-country General Equilibrium Model


- Featuring variable markups and variable markets

## ③ **Aggregate Implications**

- **Application: bilateral “trade war”**

## ④ Conclusions

# Application: Bilateral Trade War



Simulate 3 countries for 2 periods:

- $t = 1$ : competitive equilibrium
- $t = 2$ : sudden increase in bilateral trade costs between A and C


Study percentage changes of variables from period 1 to 2, i.e.,  $\hat{x} = \frac{x_2 - x_1}{x_1} * 100$

# Trade War A-C: Extensive Margin

Trade destruction: Number of exporters from C to A decreases


Trade deflection: Number of exporters from C to B increases

Number of Exporters C to A



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Number of Exporters C to B




Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

# Trade War A-C: Trade Deflection


In equilibrium, country B's currency appreciate,  
making products from C (and A) cheaper in B.

Bilateral Exchange Rates B to C



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Number of Exporters C to B




Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

# Trade War A-C: Extensive Margin


The existence of local cost component reduces extensive margin responses

Number of Exporters C to A



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Number of Exporters C to B



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C


Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)

Cyan: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition Only)

# Trade War A-C: Extensive Margin


Comparing to the model with constant markups, incorporating oligopolistic competition slightly reduces the magnitude of extensive margin adjustments.

Number of Exporters C to A



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Number of Exporters C to B



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)


Cyan: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition Only)

Dark Blue: Constant Markups

# Trade War A-C: Markups

The effect of market changes on markup distribution

## Mean Markups of Exporters from Country C to A



Allowing firms to reallocate brings in two additional effects:

- (i) selection effect: only very productive firms exports to A  
(these firms are larger and charge higher markups)
- (ii) competition effect: different markup adjustments as
  - (a) less competition due to exits of less productive exporters from C to A
  - (b) more competition due to entrants of exporters from B to A

Empty Square: Variable Markets;

Solid Square: Fixed Markets (same set of firms in each market in both periods)


Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)




# Trade War A-C: Imports

The two warring countries import less;  
The third country (B) imports more

Country C (or A): Changes in Import Share



Country B: Changes in Import Share




**Empty Square: Variable Markets; Solid Square: Fixed Markets**

**Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)**


# Trade War A-C: Aggregate Productivity

Two Warring Countries C (or A)



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

The Third Country B



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

## Percentage Differences in Responses between Fixed Markets and Variable Markets


Model	Aggregate Productivity C (or A)	Aggregate Productivity B
Benchmark	1-2% more	10-13% more

Empty Square: Variable Markets; Solid Square: Fixed Markets

Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)


# Trade War A-C: Aggregate Productivity

Two Warring Countries C (or A)



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

The Third Country B



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

## Percentage Differences in Responses between Fixed Markets and Variable Markets

Model	Aggregate Productivity C (or A)	Aggregate Productivity B
Benchmark	1-2% more	10-13% more
No Local Cost	2-3% more	5-9% more

Empty Square: Variable Markets; Solid Square: Fixed Markets

Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)

Cyan: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition Only)

# Conclusions

- Empirically, I document **within-firm** market changes:
  - (i) involve substantial switching;
  - (ii) are endogenous to relative market conditions;
  - (iii) suggest systematic changes in demand conditions in all markets
- Theoretically, I build a multi-country GE model
  - interdependence between variable markups and variable markets
  - the third country benefits more from the bilateral trade war under variable markets

⇒ a step towards building a realistic multi-country framework that captures key features of intensive and extensive adjustments **across** markets

# Within Firm Market Changes involve Non-trivial Trade Values

## Markets Changes/ Markets (**Value Measure, Median**)

	All Firms	Large Firms
<i>Chinese Exporters, 2000-2006</i>		
Firm-product (8-digit) level	0.25	0.13
Firm-industry (2-digit) level	0.14	0.07
Firm level	0.09	0.05

## Aggregate Level (**Chinese Exporters**)

	Sum of Sales of Those Changed Markets / Total Sales
Firm-product (8-digit) level	<b>0.19</b>
Firm-industry (2-digit) level	<b>0.12</b>
Firm level	<b>0.10</b>

## Breakdown by Firm and Product Types (Median, China Results)

	Market Changes / Markets	
	Count Measure	Value Measure
<b>By Form of Commerce</b>		
— General Trade	0.83	0.40
— Processing Trade	0.40	0.01
— Mixture	0.00	0.00
<b>By Rauch Classification</b>		
— Differentiated Products	0.75	0.29
— Reference Priced	0.50	0.10
— Organised Exchange	0.41	0.03
<b>By Firm Ownership</b>		
— State-owned Enterprises	1.00	0.47
— Private Enterprises	0.80	0.39
— Foreign Invested Enterprises	0.40	0.01

Deviation from the Common Trade Pattern (CTP)  
(Based on UK to Non-EU exports)

	Mean	Median	Distribution (Percentile)				Obs.
			1st	25th	75th	99th	
<hr/>							
<u>8-digit level deviation from</u>							
product-time CTP	1.34	1.50	0.00	0.67	2.00	2.00	2,118,190
firm-product CTP	0.70	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.25	4.00	2,118,190
<hr/>							
<u>2-digit level deviation from</u>							
product-time CTP	1.28	1.33	0.00	0.80	2.00	2.00	795,062
firm-product CTP	0.67	0.24	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.00	795,062

Note: This table presents measures of deviations from the common trade pattern. Two deviation measures are constructed, the deviation from the product-time common trade pattern and the deviation from the firm-product common trade pattern. Note that the deviation is normalized by the number of markets traded to facilitate the comparison across firms. Statistics are calculated based on non-EU exports of British firms during 2010-2016. Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.

## DC Ratio to Changes in Relative Market Conditions (Based on UK to Non-EU exports)

	Exchange Rate	Destination CPI	Within $R^2$	Observations
<u>Count Measure</u>				
Firm-product (8-digit) level	-0.12***	-1.06***	0.20	805,626
Firm-sector (2-digit) level	-0.11***	-0.97***	0.19	405,255
Firm-level	-0.09***	-0.92***	0.19	259,026
<u>Value Measure</u>				
Firm-product (8-digit) level	-0.12***	-1.07***	0.15	805,626
Firm-sector (2-digit) level	-0.10***	-0.99***	0.14	405,255
Firm level	-0.09***	-0.93***	0.14	259,026

Note: This table shows estimates from regressing drop-change ratio on augmented exchange rates and destination CPI measures. The upper panel shows results using non-weighted drop-change ratio as the dependent variable and the bottom panels shows results using trade-weighted drop-change ratio as the dependent variable. The subsections of the first column indicate the level of disaggregation at which the trade pattern measures are constructed. Firm-product and year fixed effects are added for firm-product and firm-sector specifications. Firm and year fixed effects are added for firm level specifications. The statistical significance is calculated based on robust standard errors with \*\*\*, \*\*, \* representing statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets, non-EU exports, 2010-2016.



# Long distance markets are more likely to be dropped

Mean Distance to Drop-Change Ratio (China Results)

	Mean Distance	Within $R^2$	Observations
<u>Count Measure</u>			
8-digit	-0.16***	0.01	1,791,353
2-digit	-0.13***	0.01	875,096
Firm-level	-0.20***	0.04	301,455
<u>Trade Value Measure</u>			
8-digit	-0.13***	0.01	1,791,353
2-digit	-0.13***	0.01	875,095
Firm-level	-0.15***	0.03	301,455

Go Back

## Mean Distance to DC Ratio (Based on UK to Non-EU exports)

	Mean Distance	Within $R^2$	Observations
<u>Count Measure</u>			
Firm-product (8-digit) level	-0.21***	0.01	805,626
Firm-sector (2-digit) level	-0.10***	0.00	405,255
Firm level	-0.20***	0.02	259,026
<u>Value Measure</u>			
Firm-product (8-digit) level	-0.16***	0.01	805,626
Firm-sector (2-digit) level	-0.11***	0.00	405,255
Firm level	-0.15***	0.01	259,026

Note: This table shows estimates from regressing changes in average distance of trading markets on the DC ratio. The upper panel shows results using non-weighted drop-change ratio as the dependent variable and the bottom panels shows results using trade weighted drop-change ratio as the dependent variable. The subsections of the first column indicate the level of disaggregation at which the trade pattern measures are constructed. Firm-product and year fixed effects are added for firm-product and firm-sector specifications. Firm and year fixed effects are added for firm level specifications. The statistical significance is calculated based on robust standard errors with \*\*\*, \*\*, \* representing statistical significance at 1%, 5%, 10% respectively. Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets, non-EU exports, 2010-2016.

# Price and Quantity Changes in All Markets

				Changes in Unit Value	Drops/Changes
$t = 1$	A	B		.	.
$t = 2$	A		C	$P_{AC,2} - P_{AB,1}$	1/2
$t = 3$	A		C	$P_{ACD,3} - P_{AC,2}$	0/1
$t = 4$	A		C	$P_{AC,4} - P_{ACD,3}$	1/1

Constructing Price Changes Based on **All** Markets

# Price and Quantity Changes in All Markets

## Price and Quantity Elasticities to Drop-Change Ratio

	Unit Value	Mean Quantity	Total Quantity	Observations
<i>Chinese Exporters</i>				
Firm-product level	0.08***	-0.52***	-2.49***	1,788,094
Firm-industry level	0.15***	-0.57***	-2.49***	873,994
Firm level	0.16***	-0.06***	-1.82***	314,537
<i>British Exporters</i>				
Firm-product level	0.07***	-0.38***	-2.04***	1,529,152
Firm-industry level	0.15***	-0.31***	-1.89***	596,355
Firm level	0.31***	-0.24***	-1.84***	280,362

Note: Each cell represents an estimate from a separate estimation equation. Firm(-product/industry) and year fixed effects are included.

Conditional on a market change,

- 1 the price is higher if more markets are dropped;  
( $\Rightarrow$  **markets with a lower price are more likely to be dropped**)
- 2 less units being sold per market if more markets are dropped

## Measures Based on Deviation from the **Common Trade Pattern within Firm**

				Common Trade Pattern	Deviation	N. of Deviations/ Markets
$t = 1$	A	B		A-C	B - C	2/2
$t = 2$	A		C	A-C		0
$t = 3$	A		C D	A-C		1/3
$t = 4$	A		C	A-C		0

### Statistics Based on Chinese Exporters, 2000-2006:

	Mean	Median	Distribution (Percentile)				Obs.
			1st	25th	75th	99th	
8-digit level deviation from the CTP <b>within firm</b>	0.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	5.00	6,042,761
2-digit level deviation from the CTP <b>within firm</b>	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	7.00	1,927,599

UK Results

Back Firm Product Level

Back Firm Level

## Measures Based on Deviation from the **Common Trade Pattern across Firms**

				Common Trade Pattern	Deviation	N. of Deviations/ Markets
$t = 1$	A	B		A	B	1/2
$t = 2$	A		C	A-C		0
$t = 3$	A	C	D	A-C	D	1/3
$t = 4$	A		C	A	C	1/2

### Statistics Based on Chinese Exporters, 2000-2006:

	Mean	Median	Distribution (Percentile)				Obs.
			1st	25th	75th	99th	
8-digit level deviation from the CTP <b>across firms</b>	1.28	1.50	0.00	0.75	2.00	2.00	6,042,761
the CTP <b>within firm</b>	0.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	5.00	6,042,761
2-digit level deviation from the CTP <b>across firms</b>	1.23	1.25	0.00	0.83	2.00	2.00	1,927,599
the CTP <b>within firm</b>	0.71	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	7.00	1,927,599

UK Results

Back Firm Product Level

Back Firm Level

# Markups and Quantities

$$\text{markup: } \hat{\mu}^{b*} = \frac{1}{1 - dm} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} (1 - \lambda)\kappa(1 - ms)\hat{\alpha} \\ -(1 - \lambda)\kappa\widehat{CE} \\ + [(1 - \lambda)\omega - dm]\hat{\chi} \\ + [1 - (1 - \lambda)(1 - \omega) - dm](\hat{e} - \widehat{mc}) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\text{quantity: } \hat{q} = \hat{\alpha} - \varepsilon\hat{p} - \frac{\rho - \eta}{\rho - 1}\widehat{CE} + \eta\hat{P} + \hat{C}$$

Subscripts are omitted for simplicity

$\lambda(ms, \rho, \eta)$  captures the degree of competition among firms

$\kappa(ms, \eta, \rho)$ : price elasticity w.r.t. market share

$\omega(mc, \chi, e)$ : cost share of distribution

$dm$ : distribution margin

$\rho$ : within industry elasticity of substitution

$\eta$ : cross industry elasticity of substitution

# Calibration

Parameter	Value
<i>Varies to match moments</i>	
Cross-industry elasticity of substitution, $\eta$	1.3
Within-industry elasticity of substitution, $\rho$	7.5
Fixed cost of export operations	0.2
Measure of local component, $\chi$	2.0
Size of taste shocks $\mu_\alpha$ ( $\hat{\alpha} \sim \text{lognormal}(-\mu_\alpha, 2\mu_\alpha)$ )	0.5
Size of productivity shocks $\mu_\Omega$ ( $\hat{\Omega} \sim \text{lognormal}(-\mu_\Omega, 2\mu_\Omega)$ )	0.1
<i>Fixed: taken from Edmond, Midrigan and Xu (2015) to match firm and sector distributions</i>	
Pareto shape parameter, idiosyncratic productivity	4.58
Pareto shape parameter, sector productivity	0.51
Kendall correlation for Gumbel copula	0.94
Fixed cost of domestic operations	0.004
Tariff rate	0.129



# Additional Model Moments





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	3 countries	2 countries	1 country
Fraction exporters (A to B)	0.169	0.194	-
Fraction exporters (A to C)	0.170	-	-
Firms of A: Home markup relative to B (median)	1.089	1.085	-
Firms of A: Home markup relative to C (median)	1.090	-	-
Exporters of A: Markup in B relative to C (median)	1.000	-	-
Firms of A: Home quantity relative to B (median)	1.289	1.355	-
Firms of A: Home quantity relative to C (median)	1.297	-	-
Exporters of A: Quantity in B relative to C (median)	1.000	-	-
Markup of domestic firms (median)	1.260	1.246	1.348
Markup of 1-country exporters (median)	2.375	2.307	-
Markup of 2-country exporters (median)	3.883	-	-
Distribution margin of domestic firms (median)	0.153	0.148	0.098
Exporters of A: Distribution margin in B (median)	0.596	0.568	-
Exporters of A: Distribution margin in C (median)	0.597	-	-

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

Go Back

# Increasing in Local Cost Component




- The existence of local cost component reduces the magnitude of market changes but improves the fits of price and quantity elasticities

# Local Component Helps to Match Intensive Margins



Go Back

# Overview: Bilateral Trade War A-C



Next:


- The effects of oligopolistic competition and local cost component on market changes.
- The effects of market changes on the distribution of markups, imports and aggregate productivity.

# Trade War A-C: Imports

## Two versus Three-Country Models

Adding the third country significantly reduce the effect of the trade war

Country C: Changes in Import Share



**Empty Square: Three-Country Models (with Variable Markets);**

**Empty Triangle: Two-Country Models (with Variable Markets)**


**Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)**

**Cyan: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition Only)**

# Trade War A-C: Quantity Responses


- (i) Market changes reduce quantity responses
- (ii) Markup adjustments further dampen quantity responses

Mean Markups of Exporters  
from Country C to A



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Mean Quantity of Exporters  
from Country C to A



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

**Empty Square: Variable Markets; Solid Square: Fixed Markets**


**Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)**

# Trade War A-C: Relative Markups and Quantities

For exporters of C:


- Markup in A is relatively lower compared to B; the difference is larger with variable markets
- Relative quantity decreases in all models; the decrease is smaller with variable markups and variable markets

Exporters of C: Markup in A relative to B



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

Exporters of C: Quantity in A relative to B



Increase in Bilateral Tariffs between A and C

**Empty Square: Variable Markets; Solid Square: Fixed Markets**

**Red: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition + Local Cost Component)**

**Cyan: Variable Markups (Oligopolistic Competition Only)**